Mr. Nobody and the Mirror of the System
On the Nature of Complicity, Cowardice, and the Right to Bear Witness — Claude.ai
There is a particular type of person that history mass-produces during eras of great repression. He is not a villain. He may even be, somewhere deep down, a decent man. He suffers. He understands everything. He tells the truth — but only in whispers, only in the dark, only when no one extra is around. By day he dutifully turns the gears of the machine he curses at night. Hannah Arendt called a similar phenomenon the "banality of evil" — but this is not quite the same thing. This is closer to the banality of cowardice, which is perhaps an even more widespread and even more destructive phenomenon.
This man is not Eichmann dispatching trains. He simply teaches his lesson as instructed. Organizes an event he finds shameful. Films what he is required to film. And then lives with it — and this cohabitation with his own capitulation leaves a particular residue in the soul that no subsequent gesture can wash away.
And yet — before pronouncing judgment — one should pause. Because history also knows another way of looking at such people. A perspective in which a man who smuggles records out of a repressive system turns out to be not a collaborator but a courier of historical memory. And this perspective also deserves serious examination.
The Public and the Private as Moral Topography
One of the central questions of any authoritarian culture is the question of the relationship between the public and private self. In a healthy society there exists normal tension between them, but basic coherence. In a sick society these two selves split so radically that a person stops noticing the split itself.
Soviet culture perfected this split and passed it on as inheritance. Publicly — one face, privately — another. Publicly — ritual participation, privately — cynical distance. And what is especially important: the person sincerely believes that his true self is the private self. The one that thinks alone. While public behavior is simply a forced mask, unrelated to who he really is.
But this is an illusion. Psychologically and culturally — it is the deepest self-deception. We are what we do, not what we think in silence. The children in the classroom do not see the teacher's thoughts — they see his actions. And it is the actions that shape their picture of the world, their understanding of what is normal, what is permissible, where the boundaries lie.
A person who publicly conducts a propaganda event and then privately calls its organizer an idiot is not a hero of resistance. He is a reproducing element of the system who has convinced himself of his own innocence through internal commentary.
And yet — honesty is required in the other direction as well. The split between public and private under a repressive regime is not always cowardice. Sometimes it is the only possible form of survival, one that preserves a person as a functioning moral agent until the moment when he can act. Soviet dissidents also led double lives — saying one thing at work, thinking another at home, passing a third thing through samizdat. The question is not the fact of the split itself, but what a person does with that gap. Whether he stores in it only personal salvation — or one day uses it for something larger.
The Flag Seen Only in Solitude
There is one symbolic moment worth examining as an almost clinical case. Imagine a person who hangs a symbol of opposition in his office — but takes it down every time someone else enters. The symbol exists exclusively as a private ritual of self-respect. As a reminder to himself of who he "really" is.
This is not resistance. It is a simulation of resistance for internal use. Psychologically, it is closer to a fetish than to an act: the object performs the magical function of preserving identity without requiring that identity to be defended in the real world.
Such a gesture speaks of a deep understanding of one's own faint-heartedness — and simultaneously of an unwillingness to face it head on. The person knows he is a coward. But the flag in the empty office allows him not to know it too clearly.
However — and this is important — the preservation of this inner flame, however small and private, is sometimes a precondition for subsequent action. A person who has capitulated completely on the inside does not smuggle out records. Does not pass them on. Does not risk even the little that this person risked. The flag in the empty office is not heroism. But it is not nothing.
The Right to Bear Witness and Its Limits
Here we approach the most difficult question — one that has no simple answer and that different ethical traditions resolve differently.
Can images of people — especially children, especially the vulnerable, especially those living in an unfree society — be used without their explicit consent, if the purpose is to bear witness to injustice?
The Western liberal tradition answers this question clearly: no, they cannot. A person's rights to privacy and to control over their own image are absolute. Procedure matters no less than outcome. Precisely because we live in a world where "noble goals" have too often justified the violation of specific people's rights.
But this tradition was formed under conditions where the institution of consent functions. Where parents can say "yes" or "no" without fear. Where a teacher can refuse to sign a form without risking not only their job, but their freedom. When we apply these norms to the reality of a provincial town in wartime, in a country with destroyed civic institutions — we risk applying the wrong tool. To demand "proper consent" where the very concept of consent has been deformed by violence is not the protection of rights. It is their formal imitation, which in practice serves to keep the system secret.
Parents in such a city physically cannot give independent consent. Not because they are unreasonable or indifferent to their children. But because any choice they make happens under pressure that an outside observer does not always know about. To sign consent means drawing attention to the fact that your child appeared in a documentary about propaganda. To refuse means drawing attention of a different kind. In such a system there is no clean choice. There are only different kinds of vulnerability.
Documentary Filmmakers and Their Eternal Dilemma
The history of cinema is largely a history of violated consents in the name of truth. And this is not a shameful secret of the genre, but its structural contradiction — one that the best documentary filmmakers did not conceal but explored.
Robert Flaherty, filming Nanook of the North — the first great documentary — staged and reconstructed what he presented as authentic reality. His subjects played themselves in a version of their lives that the director found more convincing than the real one. This was manipulation. It was also an act of preserving a culture that was disappearing.
Claude Lanzmann, filming Shoah — perhaps the greatest documentary about the Holocaust — used hidden cameras to film former Nazi functionaries. He obtained interviews through deception. He filmed people in moments when they did not know they were being filmed. From the standpoint of procedural ethics — these are serious violations. From the standpoint of historical necessity — this was the only way to obtain testimony that would otherwise have disappeared forever.
Frederick Wiseman has spent decades filming American institutions — hospitals, schools, prisons, courts — without obtaining individual consent from each participant. His method is based on institutional permission, which he considers sufficient. Courts have not always agreed with him — his first film, Titicut Follies, about a psychiatric hospital, was banned in the United States for twenty years precisely because of questions about the patients' consent. And yet today that film is considered a crucial document on human rights in psychiatry.
In all of these cases one logic runs through: when a system deliberately conceals what is happening to people inside it — the right to bear witness enters into direct conflict with the right to consent. And this conflict is not resolved by any universal rule. It is resolved — or not resolved — in each specific case, based on what is at stake.
What is at stake in our case is testimony about how the state transforms children into material for military propaganda. About how a provincial school becomes a conveyor belt producing young people ready to die for other people's decisions. This is not the private story of a few families. It is a public matter in the most literal sense.
Protection or Exploitation: On How the Camera Looks
Here a key distinction emerges that is often missed in discussions of documentary ethics: what matters is not only what is filmed, but how the camera looks.
A camera can look at a child as an object — helpless, ridiculous, pitiable, exotic. Such a gaze exploits. It turns a person into an illustration for someone else's thesis.
But a camera can look differently — with respect for complexity, for dignity, for the fact that behind the visible behavior stands a living person whom circumstances have placed in an impossible situation. When children in a film are shown not as victims, not as criminals, not as fools who have been fooled by propaganda — but as people whom the system methodically processes without asking their consent — this is a different ethical register. It is closer to protection than to violation.
The paradox is that children filmed without parental consent for an exposé find themselves, in a certain sense, more protected by that film than without it. Because the film says to the world: look at what is being done to them. It makes visible the violence — soft, systematic, ideological — that without the camera would have remained invisible and, consequently, would have continued unimpeded.
This does not dissolve the ethical problem. But it substantially changes its configuration. The question is no longer "have the children's rights been violated by the filming" — but rather "whose violation of rights is more serious: the documentarian who filmed without consent, or the state that uses these children as raw material for its own purposes?"
The Man with the Records
Let us return to the one who smuggled out the records. Let us try to look at him not only as a conformist — which he undoubtedly is — but as a person who performed one specific act at a particular moment.
He did not go out with a placard. He did not write an open letter. He did not publicly refuse. All of this is true. But he preserved the material. He did not destroy it, did not turn it in, did not record over it. In a system where the function of such records is to serve as an instrument of control and accountability and then to disappear — preservation itself is an act, however minimal.
History knows many such people — those who were not heroes, but who preserved a document. The archivist who did not burn the folder. The official who took a copy home. The soldier who photographed what he was not supposed to photograph. They did not perform feats. They simply, at some moment, did not do what was expected of them — quietly, without publicity, perhaps even without a clear understanding of why. And then these preserved testimonies became the foundation for understanding what had happened.
This is not a justification of prior complicity. It is a conversation about something else: about the fact that the moral biography of a person does not reduce to a single denominator. A person can be simultaneously a coward and a courier of truth. A conformist and an accidental witness. A participant in the system — and someone who, at the last moment, pulled something important out of it.
To demand consistent heroism from such people is to misunderstand how life works inside a repressive system. There are no clean biographies there. There are only people with varying degrees of capitulation and varying degrees of residual resistance. And sometimes even minimal residual resistance matters.
The System and Its Gears
But let us return to the more fundamental question. Why do repressive systems function? Not because they are full of monsters. But because they are full of generally normal people who every day make small decisions in favor of comfort rather than principle.
The system does not demand active enthusiasm from most of its participants. Passive complicity is sufficient. It is enough for the teacher to conduct the event without believing in it. Enough for the official to sign the document without reading it. Enough for the journalist to write the piece while inwardly distancing himself from every word.
This mechanics of passive complicity is perhaps the central psychological discovery of the twentieth century about the nature of totalitarianism. And it continues to function precisely because the people involved in it sincerely do not consider themselves part of the system. They consider themselves victims of circumstance. People without a choice. In some sense — also victims.
And here arises the most painful question: was there a choice? Could the conformist genuinely have acted differently — not at the cost of his life, not at the cost of imprisonment, but simply by quietly saying "no"?
Almost always — yes. Almost always there existed a quiet "no" that would not have entailed catastrophic consequences. It simply required accepting discomfort, marginality, the loss of status. And for most people — that is too high a price. And it is precisely this understanding that makes the history of conformism so unbearably sad: people were not monsters. They simply very much did not want trouble.
But — and this is critically important — the person who ultimately smuggled out the records and left paid that price. Late, awkwardly, inconsistently — but he paid it. He became a marginal. He lost his position. He ended up in emigration without guarantees and without a halo. This does not dissolve the questions about the preceding years. But it means the story did not end with capitulation.
The Hero Who Was Not — and the Witness Who Is
When people begin to shape such a person into a hero of resistance, something dangerous happens. Not merely a distortion of facts — there occurs a redefinition of the very concept of resistance. If a hero is someone who did everything the system required while inwardly disagreeing with it and eventually left — then there are millions of heroes. Then the very concept loses its meaning.
Real resistance is action against the system at the moment the system demands complicity. Not afterward, not in emigration, not in interviews with Western journalists. In the moment. When the price is real and must be paid right now.
But between "hero" and "collaborator" there is a third category that we often forget: witness. A person who did not stop the machine, but preserved a record of how it worked. Who did not save the children, but made visible what was happening to them. Who was not a righteous man, but turned out to be the last link in the chain that brought the truth to light.
A witness is not a hero. But a witness is irreplaceable. Without him there is no trial, no memory, no understanding. And when we demand that the witness also be a hero — we risk being left without either.
Children as Mirror
At the center of all this story — children. They did not choose their school, their teachers, their country, their time. They simply grew up in the space that fell to them. And it is precisely this that makes their fate — especially the fate of those who later ended up at war — so unbearable.
Children do not look at what adults say. They look at what adults do. They perceive the split between word and deed with remarkable precision — and draw conclusions from it. The main one being: this is how the world works. To say one thing and do another — this is normal. This is adulthood.
This is the real crime of the conformist teacher. Not that he organized another propaganda event. But that by his example he gave the children a lesson that was never written into the curriculum: the split between the public and private self is not a tragedy — it is a survival strategy.
And yet — those same children, filmed by a camera and shown to the world, received something important in exchange for the violation of their privacy. Their story became part of a public conversation about what propaganda is, what childhood in an unfree society means, what happens to people when the institutions meant to protect them begin to use them. This conversation is not consolation and not compensation. But it means their experience did not vanish into silence, did not dissolve into statistics, did not become merely the backdrop to someone else's war.
In Place of a Conclusion: On the Impossibility of Clean Hands
The genuine tragedy of a repressive regime lies not in the fact that it produces villains. But in the fact that it deprives people of the possibility of having clean hands. It places them in situations where any choice carries within it some violation — a violation of the law, or a violation of ethics, or a violation of one's own principles, or a violation of someone else's rights.
The documentarian who films children without consent violates a norm. The teacher who smuggles out official records violates the law. The parent who gives consent under duress violates the very idea of consent. The viewer who watches the film without thinking about these contradictions violates intellectual honesty.
The only one with clean hands in this story is the state that established the rules under which everyone else inevitably violates them. This is the system's central mechanism: create conditions under which resistance itself looks like a violation, and complicity looks like the norm.
Understanding this does not release anyone from responsibility. But it changes the angle of vision. Instead of asking "who is right," we begin to ask "what precisely does a system produce that places people before such choices." And that question is more important than any verdict on any particular person.
Mr. Nobody is neither hero nor villain. He is a symptom. And it is the disease — not the symptom — that must be treated.
